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Cost minimization and profit maximization behavioral assumptions are most widely used in 
microeconomic theory to analyze firm behavior. However, in practice researchers do not know 
whether every firm in the sample maximizes profit or minimizes cost. In this paper we address 
this problem via a latent class modeling approach in which we first consider the cost 
minimization problem (first class) and then the profit maximization problem (second class). The 
two problems are then mixed and the probabilities of class membership are made functions of 
covariates. This approach does not require researchers to know which firms maximize profit and 
which ones minimize cost. On the contrary, it helps us to determine not only which firms behave 
like profit maximizers but also why and what differentiates them from firms that failed to 
maximize profit. The new technique is illustrated using a panel data for the US airlines. The 
empirical findings suggest that very few airlines maximize profit consistently (if at all) and that 
deregulation had a positive impact on the chances of behaving like profit maximizers, although 
very few airlines continue to maximize profit even after the deregulation. 
 
JEL Classification No.: C51, L93, L2 
 1. Introduction 
Estimation of the production technology using dual cost and profit functions (McFadden, 
1978; Chambers, 1988) is not new. The dual cost and profit function formulations explicitly 
assume that producers either minimize cost or maximize profit. In doing so these dual models 
clearly state which variables (that is, whether only inputs or both inputs and outputs) are 
endogenous (choice) and which are exogenous to the producers. This is in contrast to the primal 
approach (production/distance function) in which the model doesn’t take the input (output) 
choice decisions explicitly into account.  
 
In practice, researchers using a dual approach have to decide whether the cost or the profit 
function should be used. Most often the decision is in favor of a cost function without much 
justification from either theoretical or empirical viewpoints.1 The main difference between the 
cost and profit function is that output is treated as exogenous in the cost function while in the 
profit function an additional condition for optimal output choice is included. Thus, instead of 
using a profit function explicitly one can use a cost function along with the optimal output 
decision rule as an additional equation. The advantage of doing this is that one can test 
econometrically whether the data support cost minimization or profit maximization behavior 
(Schankerman and Nadiri, 1986; Kulatilaka, 1985). In spite of this, applied researchers arbitrarily 
decide using either a cost or a profit function to estimate the underlying production technology. 
 
Following the methodology developed by Schankerman and Nadiri (1986) in the context 
of testing whether firms are in long-run equilibrium, one may formally test whether the 
producers in the given sample are cost minimizers or profit maximizers. Based on the test results, 
for example, one will be using either a cost or a profit function formulation. This implictly 
assumes that all producers in the sample behave in the same way. In reality, firms in a particular 
industry, although using the same technology, may differ in terms of their behavior. For 
example, some producers might minimize cost because of high adjustment cost (i.e., it may not 
be optimal for such producers to adjust their outputs to the profit maximizing level), while for 
others it might be optimal to maximize profit. Again a producer might be minimizing cost for 
                                                           
1 For example, in banking applications, Mester (1993) and Grifell and Lovell (1997) grouped banks into private and savings banks; Kolari and 
Zardkoohi (1995) estimated separate costs functions for banks grouped in terms of their output mix. 
  1some time periods and then switch to profit maximizing behavior and vice versa, depending on 
adjustment cost associated with outputs. In such a case estimating a single cost (profit) function 
assuming that all the producers behave in the same manner  will not be appropriate. That is, by 
imposing cost minimization behavior on producers who are profit maxizers and vice versa, the 
estimate of the underlying  technology may be biased. Consequently, features of the technology 
such as returns to scale, elasticities, technical change, etc., estimated using the wrong technology  
will be wrong. 
 
If one knows which producers are cost minimizers and which are maximizing profit, then 
one can split the sample into two classes. A cost function is estimated using the sample 
observations in the first class, and a profit function approach is used for the producers in the 
second class. This procedure is not efficient  because the above approach doesn’t take into 
account the fact that the underlying technology is exactly the same for all producers. The other 
practical problem is that no one knows before hand which producers are cost minimizers and 
which are profit maximizers. Consequently, this approach cannot be used in practice. 
 
To exploit the information in the data more efficiently and avoid biases resulting from 
misspecifying behavioral objectives of firms in the absence of any a priori classification rule, we 
propose using a Latent Class Model2 (hereafter LCM). In this model both the technology and the 
probability of a particular class membership (cost minimization, profit maximization, etc.) are 
estimated simultaneously. By doing so we assume that every producer has a probability of being 
in either group. Thus all the observations in the sample are used to estimate the underlying 
technology (that is the same for all) and the probability of their class membership. The advantage 
of the LCM is that it is not necessary to impose a priori criterion to identify which producers are 
in what class. Furthermore, the LCM approach is flexible enough to accommodate switching 
behavior on the part of a producer when panel data is available. Moreover, we can formally 
examine whether some exogenous factors are responsible for the presence or absence of profit 
maximizing (cost minimizing) behavior by making the probabilities functions of exogenous 
variables. When panel data is available, we do not need to assume that producers behave like 
                                                           
2 See Greene (2002) for a survey of latent class models. 
  2profit maximizers all the time, so we can accommodate switching behavior, and determine when 
they behaved like profit maximizers and when they acted as cost minimizers. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the cost and profit 
systems, the Hausman type (viz., the Shankerman-Nadiri) test for cost minimization and profit 
maximization behavior, and the LCM/mixture model. Data and results are discussed in Section 3. 
The final section summarizes the major findings of the paper. 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1  The model with cost minimizing behavior 
 
Here we consider the standard cost function approach3 that is based on the assumption 
that producers minimize cost, given output and input prices. In this approach one specifies a cost 
function and derives the cost share equations (input demand functions) using Shephard’s lemma. 
Usually a translog cost function is chosen to represent the underlying production technology. The 
corresponding cost system (Christensen and Greene, 1976) is then written as  
 
i i i i v y p C C 1 ) ln , (ln ln ln + =  
i i i i v y p S S 2 1 1 ) ln , (ln + =                                              (1) 
M 
Mi i i M i M v y p S S + = − − ) ln , (ln 1 , 1  
 
where   is the log of expenditure,   denote the  i C ln i M i S S , 1 1 ,..., − 1 − M  cost shares4, pi  is the  1 × M  
vector of input prices, yi is the   vector of outputs, and  1 × Q ] ,..., ′ [ 1 = Mi v i i v v  represents the error 
terms. The subscript i  (i ) indicates producers/firms. The above cost system can be 
estimated using either the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique or the maximum 
N ,..., 1 =
                                                           
3 Beard, Caudill and Gropper (1991, 1997) considered mixing cost functions to study differences in technology across regimes. They assumed 
cost minimizing behavior for all observations but allowed the technology to differ across regimes. See also, Caudill (2003), Orea and Kumbhakar 
(2002) for a stochastic cost frontier application. 
4 One cost share is dropped to avoid the singularity problem. 
  3likelihood (ML) method for which the error vector is assumed to be multivariate normal. That is, 
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The maximization with respect to   can be performed analytically, and substituting its value 
into (2) yields the following concentrated log-likelihood function  
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which can be maximized to obtain ML estimates of the parameters in the cost system. 
 
2.2 The model with profit maximizing behavior 
 
In the previous section we assumed that producers face exogenously given output and 
input prices in allocating their inputs to minimize cost. While such an objective is appropriate in 
some environments, it might be argued that for many producers the ultimate goal is to maximize 
profit. In such a situation the producers face exogenously given input and output prices 
(especially when input and output markets are competitive) in their pursuit of allocating inputs 
and outputs so as to maximize profit. Thus, there is an additional issue of choosing outputs after 
cost minimizing inputs are chosen. The problem is to find the profit maximizing output 
quantities. The optimization problem now adds   additional choice variables – the optimum 
values of which are to be derived from the following Q additional conditions, viz., q
Q
j j y C ∂ ∂ = / 
( ) where q Q j ,..., 1 = j is the price of output yj. These conditions (first-order conditions for profit 
maximization) state that output allocation is optimal when output price equals marginal cost. 
These equations can be rewritten, in stochastic form, as  
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=  is the output elasticity. Under the behavioral 
assumption of profit maximization, these additional conditions in (4) are to be appended to the 
cost system in (1) so that we have a complete system of  Q M +  equations for M Q +  
endogenous (choice) variables (M  inputs5 and Q outputs).  Another difference with the cost 
system in (1) is that the present system for a profit maximizing model consisting of (1) and (4) 
can no longer be estimated using the SUR technique. This is because the endogenous variables 
(especially outputs) appear on both sides of the equations in (1) and (4). The endogenous 
variables of the profit system in vector form is  
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( ) Σ , Q ′ + + ~ ] ,..., , 1 M i Q M i IN v = + 0 [ M Q i v v  where Σ is an  ) ( Q M ( ) M Q + × +  covariance matrix. 
Under the assumption of profit maximization, we have a nonlinear simultaneous equation model 
that can be written in the form 
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where   represents the vector of predetermined variables (prices, and possibly other quasi-fixed 
factors or shift variables) and   is the parameter vector. The above notation is 
appropriate for an implicit nonlinear system although in our case we can solve explicitly with 
respect to  . 
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The joint density function of endogenous variables is  
 
                                                           
5 The cost system in (1) treats the cost and (J-1) cost shares as endogenous variables. This is equivalent to treating the inputs as endogenous.  
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If the cost function is represented by a single output translog form, namely, 
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represents a trend or, possibly, other variables that shift the cost function. The absolute value of 
the determinant value of the Jacobian matrix is  
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Similar expressions can be derived when there are multiple outputs. 
 
The joint density of endogenous variables is given by  
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Maximizing the above log-likelihood function with respect to θ  and Σ  provides the full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) parameter estimates. The maximization with respect to 
 can be performed analytically, and substituting its value into (5) yields the following 
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except for the constant term. This function can be maximized using standard numerical 
techniques.  
 
2.3. Cost minimization or profit maximization? 
 
The models presented in the preceding sections are based on the assumption that 
producers either minimize cost or maximize profit. The appropriate model can be chosen once 
  7the objective of the producers is known. The question is: Do researchers know whether the data 
at hand comes from producers that are cost minimizers or profit maximizers? This issue can be 
handled in two ways. First, a formal statistical test might determine whether producers minimize 
cost or maximize profit. There are different ways to test this hypothesis. Here we follow the test 
developed by Schankerman and Nadiri (hereafter SN, 1986). Since the cost system in (1) is not 
nested in the profit system (defined in (1) and (4)) one cannot use a nested test (such as the 
likelihood ratio test) to find out which model is appropriate for the data. The idea behind the SN 
test is that under the null hypothesis that producers maximize profit the appropriate model 
consists of the cost function, the cost share equations (given in (1)) and the first-order conditions 
of profit maximization (in (4)) which imply y = y* where y* is the profit maximizing level of 
output. Let the parameters in these equations be partitioned as follows  
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0 is in effect. Let   be the asymptotically efficient, 





 the unconstrained 
estimator from (6a-6b) which is consistent under both the null (profit maximization) and 
alternative hypothesis (cost minimization, i.e., H1: y ≠ y* meaning that the observed output y is 
different from the profit maximizing output level, y*). In order to construct a valid test,   must 
be a consistent estimator of β under H
β ˆ
0 but inconsistent under H1, while β
~
 must be consistent 
under both H0 and H1.  An instrumental variable (IV) estimator is required since y is endogenous 
under H0, and appears as regressors in (4). The SN test statistic for H0 is 
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2 1 ~ ˆ ~ ˆ ˆ ~
q
A
V N R χ β β β β −
′
− =
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0, and V  is a 
consistent estimator of V.6 It should be noted that this test is equivalent to the Hausman test for 
ˆ
                                                           
6 It is shown in Schankerman and Nadiri (1986) that   ( ) ). , 0 ( ~ ˆ ~
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  8specification error in a system of simultaneous equations. Based on the results of this test, one 
can decide the appropriate model for the data. 
 
 
2.4 The latent class model 
 
The main drawback of the test in the previous section is that it does not allow certain 
producers to be profit maximizers and other producers to be cost minimizers. Consequently, it 
leads to an overall decision that applies to all producers. Kulatilaka (1985) has developed t-tests 
that can be used to test the static equilibrium specification by testing for statistical significance of 
departures between the actual and the optimal long-run levels of quasi-fixed factors. Such tests 
could be used to test for profit maximization by testing the significance of departures from the 
first order condition that price equals marginal cost. Here, we explicitly allow for such 
"departures" as part of the sampling process, and in that way we can also explain why such 
departures, if any, are observed.  
 
The alternative approach that we adopt here is to assume that every producer is 
potentially a profit maximizer as well as cost minimizer (with some probability). The probability 
of being a cost minimizer (profit maximizer) is specified by a logistic function that depends on 
some exogenous variables. This gives us a finite mixture model where the density of endogenous 
variables is given by 
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where  i π  is the probability that the  th firm behaves as if it were profit maximizing. Given a set 
of predetermined variables, W , we parameterize the log-odds ratio in favor of profit 
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where   is a vector of parameters. Therefore, we have 
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This parameterization guarantees that  i π  is between zero and one, and provides direct 
interpretation of δ . Finite mixture or latent class models are well established in statistics and 
econometrics and have been used widely in applications, see for example the comprehensive 
monograph by Titterington, Smith, and Makov (1985), and Greene (2002) for some recent 
applications. 
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We can maximize this function to obtain FIML estimates of all parameters. Straightforward 
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These posterior probabilities are firm-specific even when  i π  is a parameter. Clearly, the 
estimated posterior probabilities summarize all the evidence for or against profit maximization. 
Ideally, we would like to have Q  equal to either zero or one (or nearly so) so that the choice in 
favor or against profit maximization is more or less clear. Empirically, we cannot always expect 
i
  10that, and Q  could be anywhere between these limits. In such cases, one could say that a firm is 









3. Data and results 
 
To illustrate the technique proposed in the preceding sections, we use an unbalanced 
panel data set7 consisting of annual observations on the domestic operations of 23 US airlines 
over the period 1971-1986. A total of 268 observations are used here. Variable inputs are labor 
( ), materials ( L M ) and fuel ( ). Capital ( F ) it treated as a quasi-fixed factor. To control for 
firm-heterogeneity, we also include 22 airline dummies in the cost function.  
 
Maximizing the likelihood function given by the mixture model is an involved procedure 
primarily because it is not possible to concentrate with respect to 
1 − Σ  and  . These matrices 
contribute 
1 − Ω
[ ) 1 )( ( ) 1 ( + + + + + Q M Q M M M  parameters. When  3 = M  and Q  we have 16 
nuisance parameters. To guarantee that 
1 =
Σ  and Ω  represent positive definite covariance 
matrices we use a Cholesky decomposition, namely,  A A′ = Σ
−1  and   where   and   
are, respectively, 
C ′ C = Ω
−1 A C
M M × ( ) ( M Q M  and  ) Q + × +  upper triangular matrices. We treat the 




We report the SN test results for overall profit maximization in Table 2. We performed 
several such tests depending on instruments used and whether heterogeneity in the cost function 
(by including airline dummies in the cost function) is taken into account or not. To implement 
the SN test, we use the 3SLS estimators from two systems. The first one is obtained from the 
standard cost system, and the second one is from the profit system (consisting of the cost system 
plus the additional equation derived from the profit maximizing behavior, viz., p = MC). The 
results of the SN tests do not support overall profit maximization behavior. Unfortunately, this is 
an overall test that does not provide further information regarding which airlines are maximizing 
profit and which are not.  
                                                           
7 For details regarding the data, see Appendix A of Baltagi, Griffin and Vadali (1998).  
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Next, we turn our attention to results obtained from the cost minimizing model (CMM), 
the profit maximizing model (PMM), and the LCM. Parameter estimates from these models, 
along with their asymptotic t-statistics8, are reported in Table 1. To estimate the CMM we 
maximize the likelihood function using the OLS estimates of the cost function as the starting 
values. To estimate the PMM we use the FIML method starting from the cost system (non-linear 
SUR) estimates. Finally, to estimate the LCM we use FIML technique in which the simple 
average of estimates obtained from the cost minimizing and profit maximizing models are used 
as the starting values.  
 
We used 24 variables, viz., a constant term, a deregulation dummy (that separates 
observations before and after airlines deregulation in 1978) and 22 airline dummy variables to 
capture heterogeneity in profit maximizing behavior. From the estimated coefficients in the log-
odds equation (reported in Table 2), we can see that (i) all the coefficients are statistically 
significant, (ii) deregulation has a statistically significant and positive impact upon the odds in 
favor of profit maximization, and (iii) airlines seem to differ substantially in their individual log-
odds in favor of profit maximization. Only one airline (North West) seems to stand out in terms 
of having positive coefficients associated with its dummy variable (indicating substantially 
higher log-odds relative to the rest).  
 
In Table 3.1, we report sample averages and sample standard deviations of scale 
economies and technical change. Mean values of scale economies are 0.56, 1.037 and 0.552 for 
the CMM, the PMM and the LCM, respectively, with standard deviations 0.06, 0.301, and 0.130. 
Therefore, the models (especially the PMM) have very different implications in terms of scale 
economies. Since the SN test rejects the overall profit maximizing behavior, results from the 
PMM that impose profit maximizing behavior might be misleading. This is especially the case if 
one looks at the correlation coefficient of scale economies obtained from the PMM and the 
CMM (LCM). The correlations (reported in Table 3.2) are quite high. The mean technical 
change corresponding to the CMM, PMM and LCM are -0.029, -0.036, and -0.028, respectively, 
with standard deviations 0.005, 0.003, and 0.001. Thus, on average technical progress at the rate 
                                                           
8  Standard errors are obtained from the inverse Hessian of the log-likelihood function. 
  12of 2.8% to 3.6% per annum is predicted by these models. Although the mean technical change 
from the PMM is not very different from the other two models, the correlation coefficients of 
technical change obtained from the PMM and the CMM (as well as the LCM) is found be 
negative (Table 3.3). To focus more on these differences, kernel density estimates of airline-
specific measures of scale economies and technical change are reported in Figures 1 - 4, before 
and after deregulation. Deregulation is not found to have a large impact upon these measures but 
differences across models seem to be substantial. We believe that the LCM gives the most 
reliable estimates of scale economies and technical change. This is because the LCM allows us to 
estimate the same technology irrespective of whether an airline maximizes profit or minimizes 
cost. In other words, the LCM can impose the constraint of common technology irrespective of 
behavioral assumptions.  
 
From estimated posterior probabilities only the following observations seem to favor 
profit maximization behavioral assumption: BR (1981), CN (1984-1986), ML (1982-1986), NW 
(1972-1986), PA (1986), PO (1986), and WN. Clearly, only NW and WN consistently behaved 
like profit maximizers. In Figure 5, we report histograms of the prior probability of profit 
maximization (upper left panel), the posterior probability (upper right panel), and posterior 
probability before and after deregulation (lower panels). The prior probability average is 0.12 
with the sample standard deviation of 0.30. The median is very close to zero (0.0005) and the 
75% and 90% quantiles are 0.0011 and 0.423, respectively. The posterior probabilities leave 
little doubt that airlines are not profit maximizers. The posterior probabilities are, fortunately, 
very sharp (either very close to zero or unity), and are close to unity for about 10% of airlines. 
Clearly, the posterior probability in favor of profit maximizing behavior increases somewhat 
(from about 8% to 15%) after the deregulation but the bulk of airlines remains to be cost 
minimizers. Thus, we don’t have clear evidence that deregulation changed economic behavior of 




In this paper we proposed a latent class model (LCM) to determine whether firms behave 
like profit maximizers or cost minimizers when there is no additional sample separation 
  13information. Existing econometric tests (e.g., Schankerman and Nadiri, 1989) allowed us to test 
for profit maximization. These tests, however, give an overall conclusion either in favor or 
against profit maximization for all firms in the sample. In practice some firms might be 
maximizing profit while others might minimize cost. The researchers may not have any 
information on which firms maximize profit. In such a situation the LCM is quite useful. 
Estimation of the LCM amounts to mixing a seemingly unrelated regression model (resulting 
from cost minimization) with a simultaneous equation model (the cost minimizing system plus 
the equality of marginal costs and output prices) with cross-equation and cross-model restrictions 
in such a way that the technology is the same for all firms irrespective of their behavioral 
assumptions. The log-odds ratio in favor of profit maximization is parameterized in terms of 
predetermined variables. Estimates of this function are used to predict the posterior probability of 
firms maximizing profit or minimizing cost. The LCM is estimated using panel data on a sample 
of U.S. airlines. We find that deregulation helped somewhat but only about 15% of the airlines 
are found to be consistent with profit maximizing behavior. In other words, we don’t find 
evidence that all airlines were maximixing profit, especially after deregulation in 1978.  
  14Table 1: Parameter estimates from alternative models 
Model       Cost Min.     Profit Max.       Mixing 
  
Parameter      Est      Std err  Est     Std err              Est     Std err     
Const. 7.494  0.215  7.366 0.210  6.929 0.134 
ln(p1) 0.735  0.056  0.695 0.056  0.540 0.042 
ln(p2) -0.611  0.070  -0.607 0.068  -0.409 0.045 
ln(k) 0.311  0.124  -0.585 0.134  -0.028 0.008 
ln(y) 0.691  0.108  1.529 0.125  0.901 0.062 
t -0.061  0.006  -0.061 0.007  -0.047 0.005 
ln(p1).ln(p1) 0.139  0.011  0.131 0.011  0.056 0.072 
ln(p1).ln(p2) -0.046 0.010  -0.046 0.010  0.093 0.009 
ln(p2).ln(p2) 0.138  0.012  0.137 0.012  -0.009 0.008 
ln(k).ln(k) -0.369  0.209 -2.082 0.095  0.102 0.008 
ln(y).ln(y) -0.166  0.176 -1.508 0.065 -0.982 0.087 
t.t 0.001  0.001  -0.001 0.001  -0.625 0.073 
ln(p1).ln(k) 0.083  0.013 -0.080 0.026  0.000 0.000 
ln(p2).ln(k) -0.027  0.009 -0.042 0.021  0.089 0.009 
ln(p1).ln(y) -0.070  0.011  0.088 0.024  -0.077 0.008 
ln(p2).ln(y) 0.012  0.008 0.028 0.020  0.015 0.007 
ln(p1).t -0.003  0.001  -0.005 0.001  -0.001 0.001 
ln(p2).t 0.004  0.001  0.004 0.001  0.003 0.001 
ln(k).ln(y) 0.241  0.187 1.770 0.074 0.765 0.075 
ln(k).t 0.006  0.006  -0.018 0.004  0.002 0.004 
ln(y).t -0.006  0.005  0.016 0.004  -0.002 0.004 
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Table 2: Parameter estimates of the log-odds function 
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Table 3. 1.  Scale economies and technical progress across models 
 
 CMM  PMM  LCM 
Scale economies  0.56 (0.06)  1.037 (0.301)  0.552 (0.130) 
Technical change  -0.029 (0.005)  -0.036 (0.003)  -0.028 (0.001) 
 
Notes: Sample means are reported. Sample standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 3. 2.  Correlation coefficients of scale economies across models 
 
  Cost min.  Profit max.  Mixing 
Cost min.  1 0.633  0.823 
Profit max.   1  0.945 
Mixing     1 
 
Table 3. 3.  Correlation coefficients of technical change across models 
 
  Cost min.  Profit max.  Mixing 
Cost min.  1 -0.293  0.847 
Profit max.   1  -0.363 
Mixing     1 
 
 
Table 4.  The Schankerman-Nadiri test results 
 
  Specification  Test p-value 









1 yes  yes  no  67.659  0.000 
2 no  yes  no  144.43  0.000 
3 no  no  no  19.798  0.0014 
4 yes  yes  yes  71.052  0.000 
5 no  yes  yes  191.792  0.000 
6 no  no  yes  59.629  0.000 
 
Notes: The Schankerman-Nadiri tests were computed as follows. Under the null of profit maximization, the 3SLS 
estimator of cost-share system plus the profit maximization condition is efficient. The 3SLS estimator of the cost-
share system is consistent under the null as well as under the alternative that profit maximization does not hold. So 
the test is a Hausman specification test. The lists of instruments vary across the different cases we consider. The 
basic set is log prices, log capital stock, the time trend, their squares, and their cross-products. There are 22 airline-
specific dummy variables. Interactions of the deregulation dummy were taken with the variables in the basic 
instrument set. 
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